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Equality, Capability and Neurodiversity
Abstract
The challenges of neurodiversity have been most directly explored in debate around the demands of equality
in a democracy. The debate roughly divides into two camps: democratic equality and the capabilities
approach. Neurodiverstiy raises at least one central question that helps to think through the debate over these
two conceptions of equality: how do different capabilities and differing levels of ability affect the demands of
equality in country that prides itself on having free and equal citizens? Democratic equality, with its overt
focus citizen’s role as a citizen, pays insufficient attention to individual’s neurological and psychological
differences. The capabilities approach provides a better place to start in our theorizing about neurodiversity.
By focusing on what individuals can do with resources in a particular context, it incorporates human variation
as a starting point in the justice debate. Two questions, however, loom large. First, recognizing human
variation will make some less independent, how should we determine who gets included as an equal member
in society? Second, what limits, if any, are there on how many resources can justly be spent on the project of
attaining equality? I suggest our best current approach brings together elements from the capabilities
framework, thereby adopting a better framework for capturing neurodiversity, and an institutional approach
more readily aligned with democratic equality, providing resources for a principled limit on the demands of
justice. Using this framework I briefly argue for a presumption of inclusion and present several considerations
to mitigate the worry about limits.
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Equality, Capability and Neurodiversity1 
Douglas Paletta 
 
Philosophical investigations into equality address three distinct questions: what should be equalized, 
what is the point of equality and what is the site or scope of that equality?2 The debate over what 
should be equalized roughly divides into two camps: equality of resources and the capabilities 
approach. According to the equality of resources position, the demands of equality have been met 
once all people have roughly equal access to the resources necessary to act as citizens. So, for 
instance, the United States should require wheelchair ramps to ensure citizens equal opportunity for 
employment and equal possibility of serving on a jury. Focusing less on all-purpose means, the 
capabilities approach centers around ensuring everyone meets a threshold level of human functioning 
or capability. From the perspective of neurodiversity we can ask: how do different neurological traits 
and differing levels of ability affect the demands of equality in a country that prides itself on having 
free and equal citizens? 
The traditional paradigm of equality combines a focus on the goals of democratic institutions with 
the equality of resources position. The goal of distributive justice in this picture is to This put citizens 
on equal footing in mutually accountable relationships by ensuring each has access to the kinds of 
things that serve as all-purpose means for pursuing their interests, like money. This approach, with its 
overt focus on providing citizens all-purpose means, however, pays insufficient attention to our neuro-
psychological differences. In many ways, the capabilities approach is designed to incorporate issues 
of diversity, including neurodiversity. The capabilities approach gives issues of diversity a pride of 
place by starting from the fact of individual’s variable capability to develop a sense of the good or use 
resources. For the capabilities approach, however, the question of limits looms large. In what sense 
can we attain equality on a functioning approach when the fact of neurodiversity highlights a wide 
range of neurological difference, both in kind and degree? How many resources can justly be spent on 
the project? I suggest the best current approach to equality brings together elements from the 
capabilities framework, which better accounts for what to equalize in light of neurodiversity, and an 
institutional framework more readily aligned with the traditional paradigm, which provides a more 
principled basis for establishing limits on the demands of justice. 
I will lay out the benefits of this framework in several stages. I begin by sketching several reasons 
why the traditional paradigm sidesteps neurodiversity (§1). Next, I introduce several key facts about 
neurodiversity that a conception of equality should incorporate (§2). Then, I argue that equalizing 
capabilities rather than resources better maps onto the spectrum of neurodiversity (§3). With this in 
hand, I present an argument for a presumption of inclusion when it comes to who should be included 
in the scope of equality (§4). I end by outlining how adopting a political understanding of the point of 
equality provides a framework for establishing limits on expenditures (§5). Again, an institutional 
approach focusing on developing capabilities currently provides the best framework for including 
traditionally alienated citizens, framing how to address their needs and satisfying the demands of 
equality. 
 
1 This is a post-print of “Equality, Capability and Neurodiversity” now published as Chapter 2 in Ethics and 
Neurodiversity, eds. C.D. Herrera & Alexandra Perry. (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2013): 39-51 and is published with 
permission of Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
2 See: Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck, 1. 
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§1: The Traditional Paradigm 
 
Traditionally, democratic theory concerns itself with a different kind of diversity: diversity of beliefs 
and values. Democracy is often characterized as the second best solution – each would presumably 
prefer to live in a society guided by her substantive moral beliefs. For example, if someone believes 
abortion is immoral, a government that bans abortion seems preferable to one that leaves the legality 
of the practice an open question. However, recognizing that others hold different beliefs – beliefs that 
should not be simply imposed on the public – points to the need for a system to adjudicate conflicts. 
This is what democracy provides, agreement on a system for settling disputes about issues that 
themselves are not amenable to agreement. Within this backdrop, the point of equality is to ensure the 
equal standing of citizens by ensuring they stand in reciprocal political relationships to one another. 
 When John Rawls, the most significant political philosopher of the twentieth century, initially 
introduced this view, he coupled it with an equality of resources position. Since democracy is largely 
neutral between competing moral codes and reasonable people may disagree about morality, the 
government should not prioritize one set of goods or values over another. Rather, politically we 
should be concerned with what everyone values. Rawls called these primary social goods which “are 
things it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants.”3 These goods are unique in being 
all purpose means and include things like rights, opportunities and money. Regardless of what 
someone values, these are the kinds of resources that allow any citizen to develop and pursue what 
they think it means to live a good life. Ensuring citizens have equal access to primary social goods 
thereby respects everyone’s standing as agents in a scheme of social cooperation.  
While this traditional paradigm works well when idealized, the account sidesteps issues of 
neurodiversity in at least two ways: one methodological and one more substantive. Methodologically, 
Rawls sets out to determine “what is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the 
terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as normal and fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life.”4 He considers this the fundamental question of 
justice because failing here means the theory fails in the least ambiguous philosophical context. The 
goal is to find a successful theory in the clearer context and expand the theory to harder philosophical 
cases. In doing so, he explicitly sets aside individuals who do not fit neatly into the system as part of 
his methodology.  
More substantially, this understanding of the point and currency of equality has implications for 
who should count as a citizen. Citizens are characterized as having two moral powers: rationality and 
reasonableness.5  Citizens are rational in that each can develop an idea of what it means to live a good 
life and devise a plan to pursue it. Being reasonable, citizens recognize others as legitimate sources of 
limits on their pursuits and are motivated to abide by rules that other’s also accept. In short, citizens 
demonstrate a level of motivation, analyticity, sociality and independence that allows them to 
contribute to a scheme of social cooperation. The focus on primary social goods recognizes that these 
abilities and skills require certain conditions be in place to develop them, but traditionally 
 
3 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 79. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 525. For more on how Full Autonomy adds conditions to Rational 
Autonomy see pages 528-530. 
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neurological variation among those who have the skills or capacity to develop those skills is not seen 
as relevant to the justification of principles of justice. Rather, from the standpoint of justification 
Rawls suggests we should use an ideal “conception of ourselves as moral persons and of our relation 
to society as free and equal citizens.”6 Doing so relegates facts about human variation to secondary 
considerations. Neurological variation becomes a fact that needs to be considered when constructing 
actual laws rather than something that informs the fundamental values or principles guiding those 
laws. As Wong concludes her discussion of Rawls: “We see that the idea of the person is idealized 
and simplified, and makes no attempt to capture the full scope of human diversity in the population to 
which the theory of justice will actually apply.”7   
  
§2: Normalizing Neurodiversity 
 
The fact of neurodiversity serves as an important corrective at several levels in political theorizing. 
The central insight provided by neurodiversity involves a change in perspective that challenges 
heretofore assumed notions of the normal. As sketched in the previous section, philosophers tend to 
ignore and more recently idealize away neurodiversity. As understood in the literature, the 
neurodiversity movement makes two central claims.8 First, the difference between the neuro-typical 
members of society and those neurologically different results from natural human variation and does 
not signal a sharp break between the normal and abnormal. In part because there is not a sharp break, 
a significant amount of the characterization, stigma and differences in treatment is rooted in the social. 
Second, we should value – or at least not stigmatize – our cognitive differences. For present purposes, 
we need a framework for understanding this variation to inform both our account of equality and how 
it may apply politically. 9 
Neurodiversity refers to the neurological constellation of different neurological types, which can 
be delineated according to a trait or set of traits. Understanding diversity in terms of traits is important 
since several neurological types, like autism, are “diagnosed solely on the basis of observed 
behavior.”10 Other commonly cited examples of neurological variation range from temporal lobe 
epilepsy and depression to hypergraphia.11 While sometimes referred to as a spectrum, these examples 
show that neurodiversity does not distinguish types using a single criterion. Rather, the variation is set 
by establishing different combination of traits. For example, autists have difficulty communicating 
and interpreting social cues, hypergraphists feel a compulsion to write and “temporal lobe epilepsy 
has … been associated with a heightened sense of spirituality or mystical visions.”12 While these traits 
among others can be used to distinguish different neurological types, declaring some type of 
neurological difference a disability makes the further claim that the difference is an undesirable 
disorder or deviation from the norm that requires fixing. Neurodiversity activists claim that these 
 
6 Ibid., 520. 
7 Wong, “Justice and Cognitive Disabilities: Specifying the Problem,” 5. 
8 Jaarsma and Welin, “Autism as a Natural Human Variation: Reflections on the Claims of the Neurodiversity Movement,” 
20–21. 
9 One important aspect of the literature in philosophy should be noted. While neurodiversity refers to psychological or 
neurological difference, most philosophers approach the issue by analyzing disability. While the terminology triggers 
othering, here I use the ideas in service of the difference characterized with neurodiversity. 
10 Baker, “Neurodiversity, Neurological Disability, and the Public Sector: Notes on the Autism Spectrum,” 19. 
11 Glannon, “Neurodiversity,” 3. 
12 Ibid. 
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different sets of neurological traits can, and do, comprise individual’s identity and potentially provide 
a basis for culture.13 
The sharp distinction between the neuro-typical and others breaks down when considering two 
factors: the differences already present within the neuro-typical community and the similarity between 
those perceived as low-functioning and those perceived as neuro-typical at different stages in life. The 
first shifts from a binary notion of agency focused on rationality to one that admits of difference and 
degree. The second demonstrates overlap between those normally included and those excluded in a 
way that further blurs the line of normal. 
Rawlsian rational and reasonable citizens gloss over a range of diversity within the traditional 
normal range. Many within the range are autistic, obsessive, compulsive, depressed, and so on. The 
focus on rational agency fails to capture the first or second personal agency of these people. As 
mentioned earlier, these people are not otherwise neuro-typical with some affliction, but instead the 
combination of characteristics or traits partly makes up who they are. Someone is not a person with 
autism, but an autistic person. Put differently, someone’s neurological make up has a significant 
impact on how they agentially approach the world. Again consider the case of an autistic person. This 
neurological difference will affect how he perceives the world and thus how he processes decisions. 
To take the first, an autist “can focus on the details of parts but not on the general patterns of 
wholes.”14 This affects both the information he has to act on and the way he makes decisions. For 
example, one study found that autist’s “susceptibility to the frame manipulation [including frames 
invoking emotional context cues] was markedly reduced.”15 This led autists to make more consistent 
decisions in risky situations than non-autists. Making more consistent decisions does not necessarily 
indicate that autists make better or worse decisions, the framing or emotional cues may contain 
important information or be irrelevant depending on the situation. It does, however, point to a sharp 
difference in how autists relate to the world. Importantly, many people with these neurological traits 
may well be rational and reasonable in Rawls’s sense. However, characterizing their agency, and 
subsequently disseminating the same bundle of resources, fails to recognize the difference in agency 
and thereby equalizes citizens in a way that is not sensitive to that difference. In fairness, the 
traditional theory isn’t supposed to capture these differences, but this is precisely the problem. 
Second, accepting the impact of neurological variation on agency further makes sense of how to 
include those in dependency relationships. Neurological variation occurs across a typical life. In part 
building on the work of care theorists, everyone goes through stages of dependency and limited 
cognitive ability. Children have not yet developed cognitive capacities. Disease or injury can lead to 
temporary or permanent cognitive impairment, and many elderly live with diminished cognitive 
capacity. Moreover, the dependency is widespread with some statistics showing that “up to 20 percent 
of adults older than seventy-five suffer from Alzheimer’s and other forms of dementia.”16 Shifting the 
paradigm of membership away from rational agency opens the door recognizing these as stages of life 
with distinct kinds of agency perhaps with distinct capabilities, modes of valuing and manners of 
 
13 Davidson, “Autistic Culture Online: Virtual Communication and Cultural Expression on the Spectrum.” 
14 Glannon, “Neurodiversity,” 2. One study looking at the quantification of small numbers further evidences this point. 
Rather than seeing “four” when a small number of objects are presented, the timing of responses is more consistent with a 
process that counts up to four and is not subject to framing effects. See: Gagnon et al., “Quantification Judgement in High 
Functioning Autism: Superior or Different?”. 
15 De Martino et al., “Explaining Enhanced Logical Consistency During Decision Making in Autism,” 10478. 
16 Carlson and Kittay, “Rethinking Philosophical Presumptions in Light of Cognitive Disability,” 309. 
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political engagement, which allows these normal parts of life to be more directly incorporated into our 
political theorizing.   
Shifting the perspective of what counts as normal similarly shifts the significance of 
neurodiversity for political theories. As Carlson and Kittay put it, “This realization should compel us 
to view cognitive disability as a feature of the human condition that philosophers should take 
seriously.”17 Or, to put the point differently, neurodiversity in its various forms should be part of the 
paradigm in a political theory, not treated as fringe cases or secondary considerations. In particular, 
neurodiversity challenges the more traditional conception of rationality based agency and therefore 
the basis of inclusion implicit in the traditional paradigm. At a minimum, better incorporating this 
kind of diversity provides a prima facie reason to adopt one among competing conceptions of 
equality. 
 
§3: The Capabilities Approach 
 
Capabilities theorists tend to answer the three questions about equality differently than Rawls. Most 
notably, capabilities theorists reject the equality of resources position. When it comes to the currency 
of equality or what should be equalized, these theorists try to contextualize the resources someone has 
to see what she can do with them. This focus on how people function or what they are capable of 
tends to align with more substantive, less neutral, ideas about the point of equality. These ideas, in 
turn, are compatible with an expanded notion of who to include in the scope of equality. Sketching the 
view presented by Martha Nussbaum, one of the chief proponents of the capabilities approach, 
demonstrates how the capabilities approach is better suited to addressing issues in neurodiversity. 
Shifting the focus of equality from a more neutral resources position to the capabilities approach 
captures the two central elements of neurodiversity the more traditional view sidesteps. Namely, the 
capabilities approach deemphasizes rationality as the core of agency and foregrounds variation in a 
way that opens the door for inclusion.  
Presenting a moral view similar to a human rights view, Nussbaum, grounds the capabilities 
approach in dignity. She states, “the capabilities are not understood as instrumental to a life with 
human dignity: they are understood, instead, as ways of realizing a life with human dignity.”18 As she 
later states, “the guiding notion therefore is not that of dignity itself, as if that could be separated from 
capabilities to live a life, but rather, that of a life with, or worthy of, human dignity.”19 Importantly, 
this way of grounding the capabilities approach to equality invokes a single value, the idea of human 
dignity or a life worth living, as the single goal of politics. Nussbaum acknowledges that she does not 
try to present a comprehensive political or moral doctrine, but her approach contrasts sharply with 
positions like Rawls’s democratic equality, which focuses on enabling the pursuit of different 
conceptions of what it means to live a good life. Democratic equality provides the means to promote a 
plurality of goods where the capabilities approach ultimately seeks to promote the chief value of 
human dignity. 
One important corrective to note: living with dignity will involve pursuing personal projects that 
may differ radically from person to person based, in part, on what each values. This sounds like the 
 
17 Ibid., 310. 
18 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 161. 
19 Ibid., 162. 
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democratic equality position. If democratic equality provides the means to pursue different 
conceptions of good lives and the capabilities approach seeks to promote human dignity that involves 
people pursuing different conceptions of good lives, the two views seem to come together. The reason 
they come together goes back to the moral powers presupposed on the democratic equality approach. 
If someone recognizes the legitimate claims of others and pursues a conception of the good, they most 
likely are achieving Nussbaum’s conception of human dignity. That is, the value of human dignity is 
largely presupposed and built into the account. Here again is where neurodiversity gets idealized out 
of some traditional approaches to democratic equality. Democratic equality presupposes a notion of 
dignity, grounded in rationality, which precludes certain segments of the neurodiverse. By bringing 
the notion of dignity to the fore and presenting a notion of dignity grounded in capabilities and 
flourishing, Nussbaum presents an account that scales and adapts to the distinct neurological make-up 
of those across the neurodiverse spectrum. 
Re-centering the point of equality on human dignity or a human life worth living straightforwardly 
leads to capabilities as the currency of equality. The primary social goods, such as rights or money, 
only matter to the extent people are capable of using them. The idea behind primary social goods is 
that though some may find them more or less useful this bundle of goods will have the kind of things 
that allow people to pursue a meaningful life. The fact of neurodiversity greatly expands the range of 
how useful citizens will find primary social goods. Different neurological traits leading to different 
modes of engaging the world may have a significant impact on the usefulness, and perhaps even 
recognition, of certain resources. If the point of primary social goods is to enable citizens to pursue a 
good life, in a neurodiverse society resources serve as a poor proxy for flourishing. In contrast, the 
capabilities approach cuts directly to the point. The goal of equality is not to give people the same 
starting point but to allow them to function in a way that enables them to meaningfully engage the 
world as each sees it. As Nussbaum puts it, the goal is to ensure citizens live with dignity.  
 
§4: An Argument for Inclusion 
 
So far, I have assumed that individuals falling anywhere on the neurodiverse spectrum are part of 
normal human variation and that the difference is not morally significant. This presupposes answering 
the first question posed by neurodiversity – are autistic people abnormal – further answers the second 
– a normative question about value. While this presumption can be compelling in high-functioning 
cases, whether it similarly applies to low-functioning, highly dependent persons is less clear. While 
not all difference should be thought of as disability, some people may lack the cognitive capacity to 
recognize what is happening, much less have a conception of the good, devise a plan to pursue a 
conception of the good, bear the burdens of social cooperation or other traditionally relevant agential 
factors.20 Such individuals can give better or worse lives, but they fall outside of the scope of those 
who engage politically. Here the question of scope reemerges – what are the limits on those who 
should be included among the equal? Since high-functioning individuals may already be included and 
extremely low functioning individuals seem to fall outside the scope of even potential political 
engagement, the philosophical question of scope becomes how to approach borderline cases. Rather 
 
20 Kittay and Carson think these individuals present the biggest challenge to inclusion. See: Carlson and Kittay, 
“Rethinking Philosophical Presumptions in Light of Cognitive Disability,” 313. 
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than draw a sharp line, I argue borderline cases should be considered with a presumption for 
inclusion.  
Excluding people who seem like borderline cases and turn out to be able to participate at some 
level politically perpetrates an injustice. Sophia Wong makes this point in terms of “Enabling 
Conditions,”21 though she remains within a framework where citizenship is based on potentially 
developing Rawls’s two moral powers. Roughly, at birth anyone who could potentially develop the 
capacities for rationality and reasonableness still need certain conditions to be in place to direct and 
ensure their growth. For example, historical conditions that deprived women of education and locked 
them into servile roles in misogynistic cultures inhibited their development of capacities. Wong 
argues liberal societies “must provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling 
Conditions until they become fully cooperating members of society.”22 Failing to do so marginalizes a 
group that explicitly deserves membership in the political community. In addition to ensuring that 
borderline cases have the opportunity to become part of the community, denying rightful members of 
the community access to the political sphere directly disenfranchises them. To deny those labeled 
cognitively disabled relevant enabling conditions and access to the political arena errs on the side of 
injustice. 
The opposite seems less true. The potential harm of including in so-called low-functioning 
individuals who turn out to lack sufficient capacity to engage politically, even with enabling 
conditions in place, attaches to those in the political community rather than the person who falls short 
of being able to become part of it. This potential harm may manifest itself in various ways. The next 
section will address a potential worry about the costs associated with providing enabling conditions, 
though it should be noted these concerns with efficiency may not trump concerns about equality and 
justice. Perhaps the chief concern is granting equal political power to an individual who is incapable 
of wielding it. The lack of capacity motivating this concern, however, partly mitigated the worry. If 
someone who seems like a borderline case turns out not to be able achieve some minimal level of 
capacity, he literally will not be able to politically engage and thereby will not be able to act in a way 
that significantly impacts the polis. Selecting between erring on the side of irrelevance rather than 
erring on the side of injustice creates a justice-based reason for inclusion. 
 
§5: Some Notes on Limits 
 
The capabilities approach, with its focus on functioning rather than rationality, provides the 
groundwork for a more inclusive membership in the community of equals precisely because it is more 
sensitive to the different kinds of functioning that can be found within the constellation of 
neurodiversity. This view, however, seems to have a sharp downfall. If more people are included, and 
the presumption should be in favor of including borderline cases, fostering the development of dignity 
may require an extraordinary amount of resources. Looking across the neurodiverse constellation, it 
seems like there is always something we could do to further develop the capabilities of someone 
within the spectrum, tailored to each individual’s unique set of traits. However, as Wong puts it, a 
successful theory “must provide some principled basis for limiting our obligations.”23 Restricting the 
 
21 Wong, “Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities,” 384. 
22 Ibid., 399. 
23 Wong, “Justice and Cognitive Disabilities: Specifying the Problem,” 1 of pdf. 
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application of this understanding of equality to institutions provides a basic framework for a 
principled basis for limits.24  
Perhaps most importantly from the standpoint of limits, the capabilities approach does not present 
a maximizing conception. While everyone should live with dignity, the point of equality is not to 
achieve some privileged “full” or “normal” level of functioning. Rather, the goal is to ensure that 
within the backdrop of differing neurological make-ups each has the capability to live a meaningful 
life. Presenting a view that also brings together democratic institutions and the capabilities approach, 
Elizabeth Anderson puts the idea this way, “once all citizens enjoy a decent set of freedoms sufficient 
for functioning as an equal in society, income inequalities beyond that point do not seem so troubling 
in themselves.”25 If the main concern with resources is the amount resources it will take to develop 
capabilities in lower functioning cases, this framework provides a theoretical argument against using 
every last resource to develop every last capacity.  
The nature of institutions further mitigates concerns about expenditures. While the focus of the 
content of the policies would be on individuals, institutions are designed to effectively address a need 
or coordinate behavior. Part of what neurodiversity adds is a framework for recognizing and 
differentiating kinds of needs that should direct the structure of new resources put in place. 
Importantly, the term institutional here does not refer to anything like an asylum or mental institution. 
Rather the focus is on social institutions like schools, the system of taxation and laws or the courts. In 
moving away from means or resources, the capabilities approach focuses more on individual’s 
abilities, which can only be assessed by looking at their circumstances. As Nussbaum states, “no 
matter how much money we give the person in the wheelchair, he will still not have adequate access 
to public space unless public space itself is redesigned.”26 Using this notion of equality as a guiding 
principle structuring our social institutions precisely addresses the shape of the public space.  
As in the case of making sidewalks wheelchair accessible, frequently creating open access to 
achieve a universal design requires changing something once and will address and benefit a range of 
people. For example, public transportation systems, which provide mobility that can greatly expand 
opportunity, frequently use complex maps that provide a lot of information in a small amount of 
space. Finding ways to simplify the maps, by providing the route of a single bus at each stop or 
creating technological systems that bypass the complexity that allows a caregiver to program a phone 
alert for when to get off a GPS-enabled bus expands access to those with different attention or spatial 
reasoning abilities.27 Creating systems like GPS enabled buses further provides a useful resource for 
regular commuters. Taking lessons from universal design in the classroom, government websites can 
become more accessible avoiding flashing objects, unnecessary images and graphs; describing any 
images and always including consistent headers.28 These kind of changes expand the usefulness of 
public spaces without creating new expensive, ongoing budget items.  Moreover, where no special 
recognition is necessary for developing a capacity, the institutions will already be in place as they 
were for the neuro-typical. 
 
24 For a nice piece that brings together Rawls’s notion of democracy and the capabilities approach see: Anderson, “What Is 
the Point of Equality?”. 
25 Ibid., 326. 
26 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 167. 
27 Carmien et al., “Socio-Technical Environments Supporting People with Cognitive Disabilities Using Public 
Transportation,” 244–245. 
28 Crow, “Four Types of Disabilities: Their Impact on Online Learning,” 53. 
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Not all institutional changes, however, would be passive.29  Some institutions, like our educational 
or public health systems, play an active role in reaching out to different populations. This is where the 
capabilities approach calls for new positive duties to assist those within the neurodiversity spectrum. 
Since equality focuses on developing capabilities rather than distributing resources, there is a positive 
duty to fund research on different realistic approaches to how to develop certain capability as well as 
to recognize the value and strengths of different abilities. Also, positively, the government should 
provide regional outreach tailored to different kinds of needs. Finally, recognizing that developing and 
using certain capabilities may require confederates and caregivers likely calls for an increase support 
for care takers, perhaps by changing what counts as a tax deductible expense, providing access to care 
and providing well-researched, current information to caretakers. This is to say, creating a more open, 
equal society may well generate new additional costs. However, many of the changes would be 
structural rather than ongoing and many of the prima facie positive duties involve expanding and 
targeting services already in place. The capabilities approach provides a conception of equality tat can 
serve as a framework for targeting those services. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From this discussion, there are a few important points to take away. The fact of neurodiversity should 
impact our theorizing as much as it does our practice. Though the issue has largely been set aside, we 
already have large segments of theory to address issues of neurodiversity. Most importantly, we 
should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. We have a pretty good, though still nascent, 
philosophical framework for incorporating and addressing neurodiversity. It is a framework that 
mitigates some of the concerns over limits and points to several areas, like creating more 
neurologically open public spaces, that can be implemented and lead to a more equal society. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (January 1999): 287–337. 
Baker, Dana. “Neurodiversity, Neurological Disability, and the Public Sector: Notes on the Autism 
Spectrum.” Disability and Society 21, no. 1 (2006): 15–29. 
Carlson, Licia, and Eva Feder Kittay. “Rethinking Philosophical Presumptions in Light of Cognitive 
Disability.” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 3–4 (July 2009): 307–330. 
Carmien, Stefan, Melissa Dawe, Gerhard Fischer, Andrew Gorman, Anja Kintsch, and James Sullivan 
Jr. “Socio-Technical Environments Supporting People with Cognitive Disabilities Using Public 
Transportation.” ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 12, no. 2 (June 2005): 233–
262. 
Crow, Kevin. “Four Types of Disabilities: Their Impact on Online Learning.” TechTrends 52, no. 1 
(February 2008): 50–54. 
 
29 For a nice schema on how to approach different kinds of positive interventions and goals in resources allocations, see: 
Wolff, “Cognitive Disability in a Society of Equals.” 
  
10 
 
Davidson, Joyce. “Autistic Culture Online: Virtual Communication and Cultural Expression on the 
Spectrum.” Social and Cultural Geography 9, no. 7 (2008): 791–806. 
Gagnon, Louise, Laurent Morrton, Louis Bherer, and Yves Joanette. “Quantification Judgement in 
High Functioning Autism: Superior or Different?” Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 34, no. 6 (2004): 679–689. 
Glannon, Walter. “Neurodiversity.” Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 2, no. 2 (November 2007): 1–
6. 
Jaarsma, Pier, and Stellan Welin. “Autism as a Natural Human Variation: Reflections on the Claims 
of the Neurodiversity Movement.” Health Care Analysis 20 (2012): 20–30. 
De Martino, Benedetto, Neil Harrison, Steven Knafo, Geoff Bird, and Raymond Dolan. “Explaining 
Enhanced Logical Consistency During Decision Making in Autism.” The Journal of Neuroscience 
28, no. 42 (October 15, 2008): 10746–10750. 
Nussbaum, Martha. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
———. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 9 (1980): 
515–572. 
Tan, Kok-Chor. Justice, Institutions, and Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Wolff, Jonathan. “Cognitive Disability in a Society of Equals.” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 3–4 (July 
2009): 402–415. 
Wong, Sophia. “Duties of Justice to Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities.” Metaphilosophy 40, no. 3–
4 (July 2009): 382–401. 
———. “Justice and Cognitive Disabilities: Specifying the Problem.” Essays in Philosophy 9, no. 1 
(2008): Article 1. 
 
